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http://www.peh-med.com/content/8/1/17RESEARCH Open AccessThe autism puzzle: challenging a mechanistic
model on conceptual and historical grounds
Berend VerhoeffAbstract
Although clinicians and researchers working in the field of autism are generally not concerned with philosophical
categories of kinds, a model for understanding the nature of autism is important for guiding research and clinical
practice. Contemporary research in the field of autism is guided by the depiction of autism as a scientific object
that can be identified with systematic neuroscientific investigation. This image of autism is compatible with a
permissive account of natural kinds: the mechanistic property cluster (MPC) account of natural kinds, recently
proposed as the model for understanding psychiatric disorders. Despite the heterogeneity, multicausality and fuzzy
boundaries that complicate autism research, a permissive account of natural kinds (MPC kinds) provides prescriptive
guidance for the investigation of objective causal mechanisms that should inform nosologists in their attempt to
carve autism’s boundaries at its natural joints. However, this essay will argue that a mechanistic model of autism is
limited since it disregards the way in which autism relates to ideas about what kind of behavior is abnormal. As
historical studies and definitions of autism show, normative issues concerning disability, impairment and societal
needs have been and still are inextricably linked to how we recognize and understand autism. The current search
for autism’s unity in neurobiological mechanisms ignores the values, social norms and various perspectives on
mental pathology that play a significant role in ‘the thing called autism’. Autism research needs to engage with
these issues in order to achieve more success in the effort to become clinically valuable.
Keywords: Philosophy of psychiatry, Autism, Natural kind, Mechanistic property cluster, Demarcation problems,
NormativityIntroduction
A fundamental question in the philosophy of psychiatry is:
What kind of things are psychiatric disorders? This issue is
being discussed extensively in a philosophically oriented lit-
erature, but there is still no consensus as to the best
answer. Can psychiatric disorders best be conceived of as;
objects that exist in nature independent of psychiatric clas-
sifications (natural kinds, see e.g., [1,2]); scientifically
constructed tools or instruments that help to achieve im-
portant goals (practical kinds, see e.g., [3]); or maybe as
kinds that are brought into being by societies and cultures
through the practice of classifying human behavior as dis-
tinct kinds (socially constructed kinds, see e.g., [4])?
In this conceptual and historical study, instead of taking
an abstract perspective and arguing for a particular model
that can be applied to different forms of psychopathology,Correspondence: berendverhoeff@gmail.com
Theory and History of Psychology, University of Groningen, Grote Kruisstraat
2/1, 9712 TS Groningen, The Netherlands
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Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the orI focus on autism as a concrete case to explore what kind
of thing this specific psychiatric disorder is. Clinicians and
researchers working in a particular field are usually not
concerned with philosophical categories of kinds. How-
ever, I will argue that scientific and clinical thinking
about autism implicitly follows a certain model for un-
derstanding psychiatric disorders. Autism researchers
and clinicians increasingly acknowledge autism’s com-
plex heterogeneity and its dimensionality. Nonetheless,
autism research is guided by the depiction of autism as
a scientific and physical object that can be discovered
and identified with systematic biomedical and neurosci-
entific investigation. Current assumptions, understand-
ings and practices in the field of autism, I will argue, are
compatible with a permissive account of natural kinds,
namely the mechanistic property cluster (MPC) account
of natural kinds recently proposed by Kendler, Zachar
and Craver [5] as the model for understanding psychi-
atric disorders in general.This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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mechanistic model, the MPC model is limited. As recent
social and historical studies of autism reveal, there is
something profoundly historical and cultural about how
autism is diagnosed, delineated and treated. On concep-
tual and historical grounds, this essay will illustrate that
the traditional separation of two types of demarcation
problems in (the philosophy of ) psychiatry—between
distinct mental disorders on the one hand, and between
normality and pathology on the other hand—breaks
down when considering autism. A mechanistic model of
psychiatric disorders only concerns the former demarca-
tion problem while it is indifferent with respect to the
latter. Due to this problem, this model is unable to ac-
count for the way in which social and cultural norms,
and shifting boundaries of normality and pathology
shape and transform autism as a psychiatric entity. This
study will explore some of the implications of the nor-
mativity of autism for defining mental disorder in the
DSM-5 [6] and for future autism research.
Mechanistic property cluster (MPC) kinds: a model for
understanding psychiatric disorders
In a recent essay in Psychological Medicine, Kendler,
Zachar and Craver [5] argue for a mechanistic model for
understanding psychiatric disorders. Inspired by the
philosopher Richard Boyd [7,8] they suggest that psychi-
atric disorders can best be viewed as mechanistic property
cluster (MPC) kinds. Boyd developed the concept of
homeostatic property clusters (HPC) to challenge a strin-
gent essentialist model of natural kinds in which a neces-
sary and sufficient property or structure (an essence)
directly and causally determines all key features of a kind
(Kendler and colleagues replaced the term ‘homeostatic’
with ‘mechanistic’ to avoid possible confusion due to dif-
ferent meanings of the term ‘homeostatic’)a.
According to Boyd, there are scientifically important
kinds—biological species for instance—that are character-
ized by a cluster of often co-occurring characteristics and
by the underlying mechanisms that bring about their co-
occurrence. These clusters do not have invariable and ex-
clusive essences and the members of a kind do not need
to overlap in a fixed set of characteristics. Rather, kind
membership is defined by some set of empirically discov-
erable causal mechanisms that explain, in the case of bio-
logical species, ‘the imperfectly shared and homeostatically
related morphological, physiological and behavioral fea-
tures which characterize its members’ (Boyd [7], p. 142).
Similar stable patterns of often complex causal mecha-
nisms that involve interactions between multiple possible
levels of explanation—such as physiology, behavior and en-
vironment—instantiate the imperfect co-occurring charac-
teristics of the members of a species. They are considered
imperfect because ‘kind definitions must conform to the(sometimes messy and complex) causal structure of the
world’ (Boyd [7], p. 143). Members of a species need not
share all their characteristics, and differences between spe-
cies can be vague. However, this doesn’t imply that there
are no stable explanatory mechanisms to be discovered
underlying common characteristics of individual members
of a species.
Kendler, Zachar and Craver [5] suggest that Boyd’s
HPC model of kinds should be the key model for under-
standing what kind of things psychiatric disorders are.
They ask us to consider a multi-dimensional matrix that
reflects human mind/brain states. The properties in-
cluded in this matrix may include genes, neural systems,
psychological states, symptoms themselves and environ-
mental inputs. They argue that there are only a finite
number of mind/brain states that ‘are cohesive and tem-
porally stable, some proportion of which represents ‘psy-
chiatric syndromes” ([5], p. 1147). For them, psychiatric
disorders are best conceived of as sets of symptoms that
are connected through a system of causal mechanisms.
Ultimately, these causal mechanisms are what define
and sustain the disorder.
This MPC model of mental disorders is attractive for
several reasons. It corrects an empirically inadequate
‘gene X causes disorder Y’ (essentialist) model, it is com-
patible with the multicausality, fuzzy boundaries and
heterogeneity of most psychiatric disorders, and it pro-
vides (unlike pragmatist models) prescriptive guidance
for the investigation of objective causal structures that
will inform psychiatric nosology in the attempt to carve
nature at its joints [5]. These joints are not located at
the boundaries of single genes, infective agents or local
lesions, but at the boundaries of causal mechanisms [9].
Thus, the MPC model facilitates the prospect of discov-
ery and ‘true’ delineation of specific disorders. Since
MPC kinds are grounded in the natural features of the
world and are ‘not merely imposed upon the world by
psychiatrists through their classificatory practices’, psy-
chiatric categories will become scientifically valuable in
terms of prediction, explanation and control. Even
though there is no single causal mechanism or essential
property that explains all the superficial properties of a
kind, ‘the identity of the disease across time and across
cultures is grounded in the similarity of the complex
mutually reinforcing network of causal mechanisms in
each case’ ([5], p. 1147).
Furthermore, as both Kendler, Zachar and Craver [5]
and Samuels [10]—who defends an MPC model for delu-
sions—underline, MPC kinds allow ‘that the same cluster
of symptoms might arise from different etiological, under-
lying or sustaining mechanisms in different cases’ ([5],
p. 1147). There need not be a one-to-one relation between
an underlying neurobiological causal mechanism and
the resulting cluster of psychiatric symptoms. However,
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different members of the same kind must share a similar
causal mechanism at another biological level. Biological
heterogeneity is allowed, as long as more homogeneous
mechanisms can be identified at other biological levels. As
we will see, much of the research in autism is, despite pro-
found genetic heterogeneity, directed at identifying unify-
ing neural mechanisms that underlie all—or a subgroup
of—autism cases. According to Samuels [10], identifying
such unifying mechanisms comprises perhaps the fun-
damental explanatory challenge for an MPC approach
to psychiatric disorders. Kendler, Zachar and Craver [5]
conclude that we are ‘far from being able to define
plausible stability-producing mechanisms for most psy-
chiatric disorders’ (p. 1148). However, I will argue that
contemporary researchers in the field of autism gener-
ally, but usually unknowingly, follow the prescriptive
guidance of the MPC model.
Autism as an MPC kindb
Present-day autism researchers and clinicians increasingly
emphasize the heterogeneity of autism [11]. Lord and
Jones [12] recently stated that ‘the most significant scien-
tific challenge to the concept of autism as one “disease” or
even “diseases” is the heterogeneity of the genetic findings’
(p. 491). Even though autism is considered to be ‘among
the most heritable of all mental disorders’ [13] and re-
views estimate the heritability of autism to be more than
90% [14,15], the search for autism genes turned out to be
extremely complex. Identified single-gene syndromes,
such as fragile X syndrome, Rett syndrome and tuberous
sclerosis, are assumed to account for approximately 5% of
all autism cases [16]. Another 5% of autism cases have
been associated with genetic metabolic disorders, such as
phenylketonuria and mitochondrial disorders. For the
remaining cases, recent whole genome studies [17,18] fur-
ther affirmed the enormous genetic heterogeneity in aut-
ism. These studies illustrate that there are many genetic
mutations associated with autism that are very rare. The
number of genes associated with autism may be a couple
hundred or more, of which the most common mutations
were found in just over 1% of the children with autism,
and not exclusively in children with autism (see [19,20]).
In addition, Lord [21] pointed out that ‘anyone who has
met more than one person with an ASD is struck by the
differences between these individuals’ (p. 166). However,
heterogeneity at both the neurobiological level and the
phenotypical level has not resulted in a decomposition
of the idea of autism. Despite intense discussions about
whether to create a single autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
category or maintain distinct categories such as Asperger’s
disorder, autistic disorder and Rett syndrome in the DSM-5
[22], the idea of a yet-to-be-identified ‘true’ autism entity
remains pervasive. Wing, Gould and Gillberg [23] state that‘the fundamental problem underlying all autistic conditions
and the Triad of Impairments, is absence or impairment of
the social instinct present from birth’ (p. 769). Chevallier
et al. [24] propose a new unifying cognitive theory: ‘The
social motivation theory of autism’. They argue that
autism can be seen as an ‘extreme case of early-onset
diminished social motivation’ that explains a range of
autism characteristics, ‘including cascading effects on
the development of mature social cognitive skills’ (p. 7).
An essential nature beneath the diversity of apparent
signs and symptoms is still assumed to unite the multipli-
city of autism. Expressed in terms of a deficit in social intu-
ition or social motivation, and imagined as a fundamental
deficit in neurodevelopment, identifying autism is widely
presented as a complex scientific challenge, often meta-
phorically referred to as ‘the autism puzzle’ [20]. As the as-
sumed natural entity of autism cannot be identified at a
concrete genetic or neuroanatomical level, the attempts to
identify autism continue at even more complex and minute
molecular and epigenetic levels of neural networks and bio-
logical pathways [25].
Geschwind and Levitt [26] suggest a unifying mechan-
ism for autism in which some areas of the brain that
normally connect to the frontal lobe are partially discon-
nected because of disturbances of neural development.
Their idea of developmental disconnection, they argue,
‘can accommodate the specific neurobehavioral features
that are observed in autism, their emergence during de-
velopment, and the heterogeneity of autism etiology,
behaviors and cognition’ (p. 103). Gilman et al. [27]
and Levy et al. [17] suggest that the many different
genes associated with autism could play a functional
role, via the molecules they express, in a larger bio-
logical network that is related to neural development.
This larger biological mechanism responsible for neural
development (neuronal motility, axon guidance and
synaptogenesis) could be disturbed by many different
molecules expressed by different genes that neverthe-
less lead to similar deficits in neural development.
These deficits in neural development are in turn thought
to underlie the specific symptoms identified as autistic.
Sakai et al. [28] recently developed a protein interaction
network that ‘provides a framework for identifying causes
of idiopathic autism and for understanding molecular
pathways that underpin both syndromic and idiopathic
ASDs’ (p. 1). In a similar vein, Voineagu et al. [29] provide
evidence for convergent molecular abnormalities in ASD,
and implicate ‘transcriptional and splicing dysregulation as
underlying mechanisms of neuronal dysfunction in this
disorder’ (p. 380).
A common neurodevelopmental abnormality is still as-
sumed to unite all—or a subgroup of—autism patients.
Functional genomics, epigenetics, molecular genetics and
systems biology are among the new hopes in the search
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search fit strikingly well with the MPC model proposed
by Kendler et al. [5]. Autism researchers and clinicians
need to deal with multiple causes and (genetic) heterogen-
eity, but autism research is nonetheless directed at identi-
fying ‘objective’ causal mechanisms that should inform
nosologists in their attempt to carve autism’s boundaries
at its supposed natural joints. However, a mechanistic ap-
proach to autism is limited. This limitation relates to an
artificial separation of two familiar types of demarcation
problems in psychiatry.Two demarcation problems
The first demarcation problem concerns the question of
whether and when a certain constellation of signs and
symptoms legitimately reflects a distinct category. Is
schizophrenia, for instance, a valid disease category and
to what extent is schizophrenia distinct from schizo-
affective disorder, delusional disorder or any other
(‘normal’) state or trait? A central term in this debate is
validity. This is a complex construct with several mean-
ings and subtypes, which I will not discuss here in de-
tail. Rather, I will briefly focus on how this term has
been used in psychiatric nosology.
Robins and Guze [30] were the first to propose a formal
method to improve the validity of psychiatric categories.
In their influential paper on establishing diagnostic valid-
ity for schizophrenia, they proposed five phases in the
evaluation of a putative diagnostic category that they
thought were an indication of its validity: clinical descrip-
tion, laboratory studies, delimitation from other disorders,
follow-up studies, and family studies. These validators
were used to show that ‘apparent “schizophrenia” with a
good prognosis is not a mild form of schizophrenia, but is
a different illness’ (p. 987). Their findings provided the
basis for the distinction between schizophrenia and schi-
zophreniform disorder in DSM-III [31]. Kendler [32] ex-
panded the set of validators and distinguished between
antecedent validators (familial aggregation, premorbid
personality, and precipitating factors), concurrent valida-
tors (including psychological tests), and predictive valida-
tors (diagnostic consistency over time, rates of relapse and
recovery, and response to treatment).
A common assumption underlying discussions about
validity and proposals to increase the validity of psychi-
atric categories is that a ‘truly’ valid psychiatric disorder
reflects genuine underlying (pathophysiological) differ-
ences in relation to other disorders and normal brain
functioning. Kendell and Jablenski [33] argue that while
the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders is still based on
clinical observation, a distinct syndrome will be valid
if we reasonably expect that it can be defined by
physiological, anatomical, chromosomal, histologicalor molecular abnormalities. Besides increasing reliability,
since DSM-III the aim of psychiatric classification systems
has been to create psychiatric categories that facilitate
the identification of genes, neurotransmitter mecha-
nisms and other neurobiological markers related to
psychiatric disorders. In line with this aim, the ultimate
goal of psychiatric taxonomy, as the research agenda
for DSM-5 [34] concluded on this issue, has become ‘to
translate basic and clinical neuroscience research relat-
ing brain structure, brain function, and behavior into a
classification of psychiatric disorders based on etiology
and pathophysiology’ (p. 70).
The MPC model of psychiatric kinds is in line with this
effort. By informing nosologists, the MPC model attempts
to increase the validity of psychiatric categories, where
validity depends on whether a certain psychiatric category
captures genuine underlying differences. The MPC model
is supposed to bring us closer to the ultimate goal of
current psychiatric nosology, which is a system based on
etiology and pathophysiology with neuroscience providing
the foundation for classification and possibly individual
diagnosis. However, the MPC model and conventional
discussions on validity are largely indifferent towards an-
other central demarcation problem in psychiatry. This
second demarcation problem which will be discussed
below, concerns a more general question: How can the
distinction between normal and pathological mental func-
tioning be made?
In a comprehensive monograph on this contested topic,
Bolton [35] discusses several possible ways to make this
distinction. One way, for instance, is to conceive patho-
logical mental functioning as ‘a matter of breakdown of
meaningful connections in mental life’ (p. 16). Examples
of a breaking down of meaningful connections include
emotions that are excessive or have no appropriate object,
behavior that is not under the control of the person’s will,
and beliefs that have no basis in experience. Another pos-
sibility, inspired by the work of Jerome Wakefield [36], is
to conceive of pathological mental functioning as ‘not
functioning as it has been naturally designed to do in the
evolutionary process’ ([35], p. 17). Despite the value of
some of the theories he discusses, Bolton concludes that
there is not one single theory that adequately distin-
guishes all forms of mental pathology from normality.
Furthermore, in line with a widespread consensus among
philosophers of psychiatry, Bolton concludes that how the
line between what is normal and what is pathological in
mental functioning is drawn depends on social, cultural
and individual values and circumstances. Even Jerome
Wakefield [36], who is considered to be on the naturalist
side concerning mental disorders, acknowledges that a
biological dysfunction needs to be harmful in order to be-
come pathological, and harm cannot be understood inde-
pendent of sociocultural circumstances.
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sions, Samuels [10] is well aware of the two potentially
conflicting demarcation problems. However, he argues
that the normativity of pathology is not necessarily but
only contingently connected with delusions. Without
some reason to suppose that this connection is a neces-
sary one, this normativity does not pose a threat to the
MPC model regarding delusions [10]. Kendler, Zachar
and Craver [5] are equally aware of the evaluative nature
of mental pathology as they acknowledge that ‘values are
intimately involved in determining which psychiatric kinds
deserve clinical attention’ (p. 1147). However, values are
not only involved in determining whether the condition we
have come to call autism deserves clinical attention, they
are also involved in defining and delineating this psychiatric
kind in the first place. Taking the distinction between nor-
mality and pathology into account is crucial for under-
standing the way in which autism emerged, transformed
and is currently defined as a diagnostic entity.
A short history of the concept of autismc
Anyone working in the field of autism will agree that the
way in which autism is understood today, differs remark-
ably from how it was initially described by Leo Kanner
in 1943 [37]. For Kanner, autism was a rare and severe
disorder of affective contact, characterized by two car-
dinal features: a ‘profound withdrawal from contact with
people’ and an ‘obsessive desire for the preservation of
sameness’ [38,39]. Kanner based his findings and defin-
ition of ‘early infantile autism’ on parents’ descriptions
and lengthy clinical observations of a small and selected
group of children. Despite immediate professional de-
bates about the possible causes of this new diagnostic
entity, Kanner’s first description of autism remained
largely unchallenged for approximately the first two de-
cades after its introduction.
From the 1960s on, the concept of autism changed sig-
nificantly. Influenced by the first epidemiological and ex-
perimental studies with autistic children, an important
shift in understanding the core features of autism took
place. Longitudinal studies [40], for instance, showed
that Kanner’s profound withdrawal and disturbance in
affective contact tend to lessen considerably as the autis-
tic child grows older, while other symptoms like intellec-
tual disabilities and language problems tend to persist.
The first psychological experiments with autistic chil-
dren (e.g., by Hermelin and O’Connor [41]) that tested
intellectual and expressive abilities suggested that lan-
guage and speech problems were not due to profound
affective withdrawal or motivational failure, but instead
due to a poor understanding of the meaning of spoken
words. Whereas Eisenberg and Kanner ([38], p. 557)
regarded ‘the vicissitudes of language development’ as
derivates of the fundamental disturbance in affectivecontact, many autism researchers in the 1960s and
1970s argued that the basic defect in autism was the in-
ability to develop a normal use and understanding of
language, in combination with a global defect in the in-
tegration of other sensory stimuli. Deficits in language,
speech and cognition became cardinal features and key
characteristics in diagnosing and recognizing autism,
and (neuro)psychological tests and experiments became
an integral part of the diagnostic process.
Influenced by autism researcher Lorna Wing, a second
shift in the conception of autism’s core deficits occurred
in the 1980s. An influential epidemiological study [42,43]
and the introduction of the work of the Austrian pe-
diatrician Hans Asperger into the Anglo Saxon autism
literature [44] contributed to a new perspective on aut-
ism. On the basis of this epidemiological study, which
investigated the prevalence and co-occurrence of social,
language, and cognitive impairments in children, Wing
argued for a central division between ‘socially impaired’
and ‘sociable’ children. This division provided a new
basis for categorization, and social impairment–instead
of language or sensory deficits–became the central dis-
tinguishing aspect in the study of autism. In addition,
social impairment was no longer understood as Kanner’s
‘extreme autistic aloneness’ but as a continuum of prob-
lems in social interaction ranging from subtle deficits
in the use and understanding of the ‘unwritten rules of
social behavior’ to profound social withdrawal ([43], p.
42). Furthermore, Wing [44] argued that Asperger’s
cases [45] and Kanner’s cases [37] were essentially simi-
lar. Despite the variations in terms of severity of im-
pairments, Wing argued that both disorders shared a
common and essential characteristic: the impairment of
two-way social interaction that ‘arises from a lack of
ability to understand and use the rules governing social
behaviour’ ([44], p. 116).
Today, in line with this second shift, autism is predom-
inantly conceptualized as a spectrum disorder character-
ized by a range of social and behavioral difficulties that
are due to an ‘impairment of the social instinct present
from birth’ ([23], p. 769). Lord and Jones [12] even con-
clude that Kanner’s essential ‘rituals and insistence on
sameness are somewhat less prevalent in ASD, occurring
in approximately 25% of a sample of children with ASD’
(p. 496). These changing understandings of the core char-
acteristics of autism are usually understood as better re-
flections of what autism ‘really’ is. Changes in views on
autism are generally ascribed to scientific advancements,
better epidemiological research and improved psychomet-
ric techniques [46]. However, recent historical and socio-
logical approaches towards autism express a different
perspective on the changing meaning of autism.
Eyal et al. [47] and Nadesan [48] in particular demon-
strate that autism and its conceptual changes cannot be
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institutions; ideas about deficiency, abnormal behavior
and unmet needs of children; and the need of clinicians,
parents, researchers and society at large to demarcate
and structure a particular problem with social behavior.
Eyal et al. [47], for instance, explain the broadening of
the criteria for autism and the exponential rise in num-
bers of people diagnosed with autism in terms of a
process of deinstitutionalization of mental retardation in
the mid-1970s, a growing availability of services from
1991 onwards when autism was added to the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) in the United
States federal law, and parental activism. The way in
which Kanner’s cardinal symptom of autistic aloneness
and lack of interest in other people was changed in
DSM-III-R [49] into only one of many manifestations of
‘qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction’,
indicates not a better understanding of autism, they
argue, but an increased need to demarcate and treat a
wider range of problems. Emerging autism therapies, the
rise of an active parents’ movement, and new ideas
about childhood pathology and ‘deviant’ behavior played
an important role in this process [19].
In her history of the emergence of autism, Nadesan
[48] demonstrates how the formalization of compulsory
education and the emergence of the child guidance
movement in the first half of the twentieth century led
to increased forms of surveillance over childhood, an in-
creased public concern over ‘deviant’ children posing a
threat to social stability, and, hence, an increased de-
mand for childhood mental health professionals. Under-
standings of normality and pathology in mental health
shifted and community clinics and special schools for
deviant children emerged. Autism could only emerge
as a diagnostic category because, according to Nadesan
(p. 53), ‘it was within these schools and clinics that a
new cadre of experts … encountered a class of children
who escaped the increasingly narrow parameters of nor-
mality but whose apparent pathologies could not be sat-
isfactorily explained by the extant psychiatric categories’.
Diagnosing autism and intercultural variability
As this brief history of the concept of autism illustrates,
the core characteristics of autism have changed remark-
ably. Currently, it is not disturbances of affective contact
or language deficits, but impairments in social inter-
action that are central in defining and diagnosing aut-
ism. Throughout these changes, conceptualizing autism
has always been related to the medical commitment to
correcting undesirable conditions, and defining autism
has been related to the needs of clinicians, researchers,
society and parents to structure, comprehend and treat
different types of disability, suffering and ‘abnormality’
wherever they occur [19]. The official and generallyaccepted DSM category of autistic disorder–the starting
point for clinical practice and fundamental autism re-
search–is replete with value terms that express these
needs and undesirable conditions. For instance, the
quintessential impairments in social interaction are char-
acterized by a failure to develop appropriate relation-
ships, a lack of seeking to share enjoyment, and a lack of
social reciprocity. Communication impairments are
manifested by a lack of appropriate make-believe or so-
cial imitative play, et cetera [50].
A diagnosis of autism inevitably (co-)depends on per-
sonal and cultural ideas of appropriate peer relationships,
normal play behavior, and appropriate empathizing skills.
Diagnostic and classification practices cannot avoid de-
pending on often implicit socio-cultural norms related to
normal child development, such as making friends, seek-
ing to share enjoyment or making eye contact, and on ex-
periences of abnormality, impairment and disability that
emerge within a social sphere.
When social context and socio-cultural norms do play a
role in defining and delineating autism, one would expect
that different cultural perceptions of social competence,
child development and health will lead to intercultural
variability in conceptualizing and diagnosing autism.
Existing cross-cultural and multicultural epidemiological
studies on autism are not particularly sensitive to this
conceptual variability [51] and typically use Western DSM
definitions and diagnostic tests to investigate differences
in prevalence rates across nations, cultures and races (see
e.g. [52,53]). Prevalence differences related to racial or
ethnic background [54], socioeconomic status [55], neigh-
borhoods [56] or Western and non-Western nations [57]
are usually ascribed to differences in awareness, (access
to) services, diagnostic resources, available treatments or
research methodology. Unfortunately, the common as-
sumption that autism is a recognizable neurobiological
disorder with little variation in behavioral manifestation
across culture, ethnicity, and social class has made in-
vestigating intercultural variation in conceptualizing and
diagnosing autism, and in perceptions of abnormality, dis-
ability and suffering appear less relevant for cross-cultural
autism research.
A study that investigated the prevalence of autism in
South Korean school-aged children estimated a preva-
lence of 2.64% in a population sample [58]. About two-
thirds of the children identified in the study as having
autism attended mainstream schools and were undiag-
nosed and untreated. The authors conclude that their
findings underscore the need for better autism detection,
assessment, and services in South Korea. However, their
findings raise an unattended question of whether their
Western autism diagnosis is meaningful in a South Korean
cultural context where many children apparently function
reasonably well with a supposed autism disorder. Major
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American society, for instance regarding how children
play and socialize, how parents think about normal child
play and development and how structure and routine are
emphasized within the classroom [59] are not considered
to affect autism prevalence rates nor are they considered
to be relevant for conceptualizing and diagnosing autism.
Cross-cultural prevalence studies typically do not question
the Western concept of autism but project it onto differ-
ent socio-cultural contexts.
A few anthropological studies take a different ‘insider’
view of autism from the perspective of local professionals
and societal members. Connors and Donnellan [60] for
instance explored the perception of disease and disability
from the cultural perspective of the Navajos. Their an-
thropological fieldwork revealed that different expecta-
tions, notions of childhood, ideas of social competence,
health and sickness, resulted in different ideas of abnor-
mality and autism. Local health professionals tended not
to use biomedical disease entities or syndromes like aut-
ism, but instead to describe and classify isolated symp-
toms in relation with the broader context of the harmony
of the community. Daley and Sigman [61] analyzed diag-
nostic conceptualizations of autism among Indian psychi-
atrists and hypothesized that, compared to the United
States, Indian parents and professionals were more likely
to detect and emphasize social deficits as fundamental to
autism due to the importance of social conformity in In-
dian culture. Whereas in Anglo-American culture, which
is more focused on language development, parents and
professionals were more likely to detect and underscore
delays or regression in language skills as central in diag-
nosing autism. Unfortunately, these types of comparative
studies are rare, but they illustrate a way in which cultural
and professional norms, habits and practices shape diag-
nostic practices and conceptions of autism.
Why autism is not an MPC kind
As Cooper [62] convincingly argues, culture-bound syn-
dromes that emerge in highly specific social and histor-
ical contexts can still be distinct ‘natural’ disorders. For
instance, similar to different kinds of igneous rocks that
are created under specific environmental conditions, a
mental disorder can be influenced by cultural and envir-
onmental factors such as diet, lifestyle or environmental
pollution, and still be a distinct natural (MPC) kind
grounded in a network of causal mechanisms. Social and
cultural factors can be considered as causal agents that
become part of the entire network of causal mechanisms
associated with the particular kind. Biology and culture
may interact, Cooper argues, ‘so as to produce cases of a
disorder that are recognizably and reliably similar to
each other and such disorders can usefully be recognized
by psychiatric classification systems’ ([62], p. 331).Following Cooper’s argument, putative culturally and
historically specific causal factors (e.g., child-rearing
practices or environmental toxins) and, as a hypothetical
consequence, varying prevalences or manifestations of
autism all over the world would not necessarily threaten
a mechanistic (MPC) model of autism. However, the
fundamental requirement of the model, that the identity
and boundaries of a particular disorder are set by causal
mechanisms, is particularly problematic for autism. As
Kendler, Zachar and Craver argued, ‘the identity of the
disease … is grounded in the similarity of the complex
mutually reinforcing network of causal mechanisms in
each case’ ([5], p. 1147). ‘An MPC kind’ is their best an-
swer to the ontological question: What kind of thing is a
psychiatric disorder? However, the historically and cul-
turally variable boundaries of ‘impairment of social
interaction’ or ‘a lack of ability to understand and use
the rules governing social behaviour’—now considered
essential features of autism—are clearly not set by causal
mechanisms. This issue of setting the boundaries of aut-
ism is not just a matter of demarcating a coherent clus-
ter of signs and symptoms, it is also a matter of
demarcating normality from pathology.
Social and cultural values and norms not only influ-
ence whether a certain cluster of symptoms is consid-
ered as a disorder, but they play, in autism at least, a
necessary role in what becomes a recognizable cluster of
symptoms in the first place. Defining autism as a noso-
logical entity incorporates the (shifting) needs and dis-
contents of a society regarding how an individual
interacts with others, empathizes, makes friends, seeks
to share enjoyment, initiates small-talk, and figures out
implicit social norms. This blurs the boundaries between
the two discussed demarcation problems as demarcating
autism (and identifying neurobiological dysfunctions re-
lated to autism) necessarily involves demarcating un-
desirable conditions. An MPC model of autism that
attempts to ground the identity and boundaries of aut-
ism in causal mechanisms disregards these normative
dimensions.
Implications for the definition of mental disorder in DSM-5
Both in the definition of mental disorder in DSM-IV
[63] and in the proposal by Stein et al. [6] for a modified
definition of mental disorder for DSM-5, the two dis-
cussed demarcation problems are reflected in separate
criteria (see also Broome & Bortolotti [64] and Verhoeff
& Glas [65]). In particular, criterion A, that a mental dis-
order is ‘a behavioral or psychological syndrome or pat-
tern that occurs in an individual’, implicitly concerns the
first demarcation problem, whether a certain cluster
of features legitimately reflects a distinct disease ([6], p.
1761). Criterion B—‘the consequences of which are cli-
nically significant distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or
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functioning)’—refers to the second general problem of de-
marcating normality from pathological mental functioning.
The separation of the two demarcation problems in dif-
ferent criteria is compatible with an MPC model of psy-
chiatric kinds, in which a behavioral or psychological
syndrome or pattern (cluster) reflects underlying (psycho-
biological) mechanisms. Whether it ‘deserves clinical at-
tention’ (criterion B) can be approached as a separate
issue. However, for autism, as we have seen, these two
problems are inextricably linked to each other. This essay
is not the place to propose an alternative definition of
mental disorder. However, the phrase ‘in an individual’ in
criterion A is particularly problematic for autism and de-
serves some more attention here.
As Broome and Bortolotti [64] indicated, the phrase
‘in an individual’ is complex, controversial and carries
conceptual baggage. It may seem evident that certain
psychological states and behavioral patterns belong to or
reside in an individual. However, as the case of autism il-
lustrates, the recognition and description of an autistic
behavioral pattern or particular autism signs and symp-
toms is profoundly embedded in a social and cultural
context. Defining autism depends on historically and
culturally variable ideas about deficiency, abnormality
and dysfunction, and on the need to demarcate and treat
particular discontents and impairments that have ap-
peared. The case of autism, generally considered to be
one of the most ‘biological’ of all mental disorders, illus-
trates Broome and Bortolotti’s [64] suggestion: ‘that at
the very least the claim that a disorder occurs “in an in-
dividual” warrants further examination’ (p. 1784).
For a definition of mental disorder, the challenge will
be to find a way to integrate values and social norms
that unmistakably play a role in what we have come to
understand as mental disorder, without falling victim to
a medicalization of social problems (see also Sadler
[66]). This may be close to impossible, but it is better to
expose and explore this difficulty than to artificially re-
strict mental disorder to that which is ‘in an individual’
while ignoring societal aspects.
Conclusions
This essay challenges—not with empirical evidence or re-
search, but on conceptual and historical grounds—the
mechanistic model that is implicit in current autism re-
search and practice. The mechanistic property cluster
(MPC) model [5], which attempts to define and delineate
autism in terms of causal mechanisms, is attractive for
several reasons: it corrects an empirically flawed essential-
ist model; it is compatible with the multicausality, hetero-
geneity and fuzzy boundaries of many mental disorders; it
provides prescriptive guidance for the investigation of ob-
jective causal structures; and it ‘satisfies the intuitionsof reductionist psychiatrists’ (p. 1148). Current autism
research fits the MPC model strikingly well, as autism
research—despite the acknowledged heterogeneity of
the condition—is guided and regulated by the depiction
of autism as a scientific and natural object that can be
discovered and identified with systematic neuroscien-
tific investigation.
However, the MPC model of natural kinds disregards
the way in which autism relates to ideas about what kind
of behavior is inappropriate and in need of correction or
support. Two familiar demarcation problems in psych-
iatry–between distinct psychiatric disorders on the one
hand, and between normality and pathology on the other
hand–are unjustifiably disconnected in an MPC ap-
proach to autism. As historical studies, a few anthropo-
logical studies and current conceptions of autism show,
normative issues concerning disability, impairment, nor-
mal social interaction and societal needs and discontents
have been and still are inextricably linked to how we
recognize and understand autism.
Some implications for autism research
The current tenacious search for autism’s unity in ob-
jective neurobiological mechanisms pays little attention
to the values, social norms and context-dependent per-
spectives on mental pathology that play a significant role
in ‘the thing called autism’. For instance, issues like the
social acceptance of diversity; the framing effects and
performativity of an autism diagnosis regarding a child’s
identity, social relations and societal challenges and pos-
sibilities; the relationship between suffering and impair-
ment and the demands of the social world; the historical
development of the concept of autism; and implicit
(shifting) norms in social life and children’s behavior, all
become relatively unimportant in the scientific search
for autism’s unity at neurobiological levels. A serious en-
gagement of clinicians and autism researchers with these
issues will enable the autism field to broaden its scope in
the direction of the human and social sciences. After all,
as Patil and Giordano ([67], p. 6) point out, ‘the distinc-
tion between what is normal and abnormal … will need
to be made, and any such distinction must be practical
in the sense of its viability to sustain the good of patient-
centered clinical care’. Therefore, these contextual and
social issues need to be taken into account in order to
better inform clinical practice, and whether neurobio-
logical autism research ‘will serve such practical ends re-
mains to be seen’ ([67], p. 7).
This does not imply that neuroscientific research could
not be valuable in autism research. The identification of
neurobiological mechanisms associated with clusters of
symptoms will remain important in developing potential
treatments. However, letting go of an MPC model for
autism and the idea of discovering the true nature of
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medical perspectives and research purposes, and creates
space for alternative modes of classification that for in-
stance do not take autism as a nosological (neurobio-
logical) entity as the main point of departure for research
and clinical practice. Furthermore, de-emphasizing the
objective to ground autism in causal mechanisms might
result in a broadening of the scope of interventions, allow-
ing them to go beyond the (neurobiological) individual.
Eventually, what we should aim for is not grounding aut-
ism in causal mechanisms, but creating a sensible connec-
tion between autism research and the everyday concerns
and needs of ‘autistic’ patients and their families.
Endnotes
aThe term ‘natural kind’ is not at all clear-cut and dif-
ferent accounts of natural kindhood have been associ-
ated with many different classes of things, such as
chemical elements, biological species, colors, stars, and
psychiatric disorders. Some philosophers question the
value of the term [68] and it is not my intention to get
drawn into metaphysical disputes about what exactly de-
fines a natural kind. However, a natural kind approach
matters in scientific practice. Natural kinds make good
objects of scientific discovery, are related with the search
for mechanistic explanations, and allow for inductive
generalizations [19].
bThis sections draws on [19] pages 416-421.
cFor a longer history of the concept of autism, see [69].
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